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DISASTER RECOVERY IN RURAL COMMUNITIES:
A CASE STUDY OF SOUTHWEST LOUISIANA
DEBORAH M. TOOTLE
UN IVERSITY OF ARKANSAS

ABSTRACT
This paper provides a descriptive case study to develop a better understanding of the disaster recovery
and rebuilding process in the three parishes (counties) in South Louisiana that were hardest hit by Hurricane
Rita in 2005. The data come from a number of sources: official documents, news articles, published data and
personal observations. This case study implications raises questions about current approaches to disaster
recovery. It also suggests strategies for practice, program development, and policy are suggested.

Introduction
In the late summer and early fall of 2005, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
destroyed most of New Orleans and the communities along coastal Alabama,
Mississippi, Louisiana and Texas. More than a year later, many of these
communities remain in ruins. Residents in most of the rural communities, especially
those communities decimated by Hurricane Rita, are eager to rebuild their home
and their lives. However, the recovery and rebuilding process has not moved along
as it should. It is difficult to understand why without knowing more about the social
forces affecting the recovery and rebuilding process.
This paper provides a descriptive case study undertaken to develop a better
understanding of the disaster recovery and rebuilding process in the three parishes
(counties) in South Louisiana that were hardest hit by Hurricane Rita. The data
come from a number of sources: official documents, news articles, published data
and personal observations. Both my residence and work plunged me into the middle
of the hurricane recovery process. At the time Hurricane Rita struck, I was living
in Vermilion Parish, one of the three parishes in question, and working for the
Louisiana Cooperative Extension Service in Community Development. After the
hurricane, I headed up the Hurricane Rita Recovery Task Force for the Louisiana
State University Agricultural Center. I spent the next nine months working in the
field in Southwest Louisiana in those parishes devastated by Rita.
Hewitt (1995) suggests that the voices of active participants in the recovery
process are mostly missing in the long-term community recovery literature. I hope
to provide some of that voice in this paper.
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(S)ome of the most important developments in the understanding of disaster
in recent years, come from workers on the ground….More broadly
significant are studies by those who have spent extended periods in, and
paid attention to the larger social and environmental context of the places
where disasters have occurred (Hewitt 1995:326).
This paper is based on those nine months in the field. In the first section, I begin
with a brief overview of the disaster recovery literature and recovery processes. In
the second section I talk about the profound impacts of the storm on the people and
communities in the parishes. In the third section, I discuss the role of outside
expertise in the disaster recovery and community rebuilding process. In the fourth
and concluding section of the paper, I discuss the implications of this study for
managing long-term community recovery.
Disaster Recovery: A Brief Overview
In a moderately short time frame (roughly half a century) disaster response and
recovery has been approached from a number of diverse perspectives, including
structural functionalism (Bates and Peacock 1987), conflict (Stalling 1988), and
symbolic interaction (Nigg and Tierney 1993; Nigg 1995). In the process, it has also
evolved through at least two distinct paradigms: hazard and vulnerability.
The earliest body of research, which began to emerge as a recognizable research
literature in the 1960s, framed the environment as an agent of disaster or hazard.
Accordingly, risk and disaster are embedded within the natural environment,
technology, or the built environment. Inherent to this paradigm is the conviction
that individuals, businesses and communities are victims of extreme events and
dependent on outside or professional assistance for their recovery (Burton, Kates,
and White 1978; Flint and Luloff 2005; Hewitt 1995; 1998).
Later research began to acknowledge the role of social vulnerability, manifested
through preexisting social structures and conditions, in the explanation of the
impacts and responses to disasters (Petterson 1999; Rolfe and Britton 1995). Like
the hazard paradigm, this perspective discounts the capacity of local communities
to respond appropriately and constructively to disaster (Flint and Luloff 2005;
Hewitt 1995; 1998; Kreps 1984; Picou and Martin 2006; Saenz and Peacock 2006).
More recently, as disaster research evolved along with other social science research,
researchers are acknowledging the importance of both the hazards and vulnerability
paradigms (see Hewitt 1995; Flint and Luloff 2005). Today, most researchers
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recognize that both environmental and social processes affect the impacts of disaster
and the disaster recovery process.
Nonetheless, a number of questions remain unresolved and continue to be
debated or ignored in the literature. Some researchers posit differences in disaster
risk and recovery according to whether the event is natural or technological in
nature and whether the effects are therapeutic or “corrosive” (Erikson 1976;
Freudenberg 1997; Picou, Marshall, and Gill 2004). Other questions concern
whether or how disasters create long-term social change (Bates et al. 1963; Nigg
and Tierney 1993; Stallings 1988). Both of these arguments have a persistent
presence in the community disaster recovery literature. Conversely, the capacity of
the community to act has been largely excluded in research on the recovery process
(Flint and Luloff 2005).
The lion’s share of the existing work on disaster recovery focuses on either
“short-term, immediate social responses to natural disasters” (Picou et al.
2004:1495; Quarantelli and Dynes 1977; Quarantelli 2003) or social, psychological
and economic impacts of the disasters on individuals, families, groups and
businesses (Arata et al. 2004; Bates et al. 1963; Dash et al. 2007; Morrow and
Enarson 1999; Picou et al. 2004; Picou and Martin 2006; Saenz and Peacock 2006).
Other social science research on disaster recovery is concerned with the
recovery process and factors that affect recovery. In the Triumph Over Tragedy
publication on disaster recovery, Evans and Wiens (2004) discuss community
disaster recovery as a process that typically unfolds over three major stages: relief,
recovery and rebuilding. Some disaster researchers feel that this framework is too
simplistic (Petterson 1999; Miletti 1999; Berke and Beatley 1997; Berke, Karetz and
Wenger 1993). They maintain that the process of community recovery is actually
chaotic, dynamic, and interactive, rather than orderly and progressive (Petterson
1999). Rubin (1995), on the other hand, conceptualizes community disaster recovery
as consisting of three stages (minimal/restoration, foresight/mitigation, and
visionary/community), similar to those suggested by Evans and Wiens (2004), but
maintains that these stages are fluid, dynamic, and progressively more difficult.
Social science literature identifies other issues that may confound the disaster
recovery process. Obviously, the level of destruction affects recovery. Hurricane
victims who have not fully recovered from the individual and collective traumas are
not concerned about long range community development. Until their immediate
needs of family, shelter, food, clothing, and employment are met, they simply cannot
move forward to think about rebuilding (Wilkinson 1991). Local leaders can also
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be overwhelmed with the extent of the situation, but often cannot mobilize the
resources to address the challenges created by the disaster (Flint and Luloff 2005;
Rolfe and Britton 1995), especially in resource-strapped rural communities (Saenz
and Peacock 2006). Still other factors include prior attention to emergency
management, and political processes (Petterson 1999).
Compared to the richness of research literature on disaster impacts, response
and short-term recovery, there is relatively little research on long-term community
recovery. It is frequently the least understood of the responses to disaster (Berke
et al. 1993; Flint and Luloff 2005) Notable exceptions are the longitudinal study of
Hurricane Audrey and long-term recovery in Cameron Parish, Louisiana by Bates,
et.al, (1963), the work of Steven Picou and his colleagues on the Exxon Valdez oil
spill in Alaska (2000; 2004) and the study of the effects of Hurricane Andrew on a
south Florida community by Nicole Dash and her colleagues (2007).
Disaster research tends to focus on the immediate postdisaster experience;
it does not routinely study the long-term recovery path. Such a time frame
limits the opportunity to understand what conditions make communities
more resilient or more likely to recover in the long term. Longitudinal
studies of disaster recovery beyond the immediate postdisaster stage are
needed to reduce vulnerabilities and increase capacities (Flint and Luloff
2005:402).
Flint and Luloff (2005) have proposed a model that takes account of both
environmental (hazard paradigm) and social processes (vulnerability paradigm) and
the capacity of local communities to act. This approach focuses on the intersections
of the natural environment and local social interaction; it is based on the work of
Wilkinson (1991). In recognizing the capacity for local action, this integrated
approach provides the groundwork for understanding the long-term recovery
process. Local capacity is defined in terms of interactional characteristics of
communities and refers to the ability of communities to mobilize collective
resources for the sake of the community (Flint 2004; Flint and Luloff 2005).
According to this perspective, communities are more likely to take collective action
in the long-term recovery process if they have the capacity to act (see Wilkinson
1991).
In the field, I found that all of these perspectives were useful in helping to
understand the dynamics within those communities decimated by Hurricane Rita.
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They all provided some insights into the factors that would affect disaster response
and at least short-term recovery. However, the integrated model proposed by Flint
and Luloff (2005), which is embedded within Wilkinson’s approach to community
action, provided a framework for understanding disaster impacts as well as a point
of departure for understanding the long-term community redevelopment process.
Trauma and Loss in the Community
On September 24, 2005, Hurricane Rita made landfall along the Texas and
Louisiana border. Although Rita was only a Category 3 storm when it hit, it was
an expansive storm and wreaked havoc along the border and hundreds of miles on
either side of it. In Louisiana, the coastal parishes of Cameron and Vermilion, and
Calcasieu Parish which borders Texas, were hit the hardest. The damage in
Calcasieu was fairly typical of the wind damage seen with most catastrophic storms.
Lower Cameron Parish, however, was literally wiped off the map by a tidal surge,
estimated to be between 15 and 20 feet high. Lower Vermilion and Cameron were
inundated by rapidly and violently rising waters. In some places people and animals
huddled on rooftops until rescued by neighbors.
Calcasieu Parish
Calcasieu Parish is part of the Lake Charles, LA metro area. It was moderately
populated (185,419 people) and before Hurricane Rita, growing (9.2% increase in
population between 1990 and 2000). With 77 percent of the population being high
school graduates, the residents are slightly better educated than average (74.8
percent) in Louisiana. It is no surprise that per capita money income ($17,710) and
median household income ($36,587) also exceed the Louisiana average. Almost half
of the population in the parish lives in Lake Charles. The economy of the parish is
based largely on oil and gas related manufacturing, retail sales and agriculture,
primarily rice, sugarcane and cattle.
According to data collected by FEMA (2006), more than 61 percent of the
buildings in Calcasieu Parish suffered significant damage from the winds. The
damage in Calcasieu was fairly typical of the wind damage seen with most
catastrophic storms. The large office buildings downtown suffered a great deal of
wind damage, as did most homes. Roofs were completely blown off many homes.
Most of the city of Lake Charles was covered in “blue roofs” and massive oak trees
were down throughout the parish, blocking roads and tearing down utility lines. As
late as June 2006, nine months after Rita hit, many roofs were still capped in blue.
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Cameron and Vermilion Parishes
Cameron Parish belongs to the Lake Charles, LA metro area, but there is
nothing urban about it. It is largely coastal marshland and wildlife is abundant. Less
than 10,000 people live in Cameron Parish and before Rita hit, there were a little
more than 3,500 (3,592) households in the parish. However, prior to the storm,
Cameron Parish had been growing; between 1990 and 2000, the population
increased by 7.9 percent. Cameron Parish is just south of Calcasieu Parish and most
of the growth took place in the northern part of the parish adjacent to the City of
Lake Charles. In contrast to Calcasieu Parish, the residents tend to be less educated
than most of the people in Louisiana. Sixty-eight percent (68.1 percent) of the
population of Cameron are high school graduates. Per capita income ($15,348) is
less than average ($16,912) but at $35,998, median household income is slightly
higher than average ($33,792). Much of the employment in Cameron is gas and oil
industry related. There are relatively large numbers of shrimpers and oyster
fisherman living and working along the coast. Cattlemen graze scattered herds of
cattle in the marshy grasslands.
Vermilion Parish lies just to the east of Cameron. It is part of the Abbeville, LA
micropolitan area. A little more than 55,000 people lived in the parish before the
storm. It too had grown slightly over the past decade, increasing from 53,807
people in 1990. There were almost 20,000 (19,832) households in Vermilion Parish.
The residents, like those of Cameron, are typically less educated than other
Louisiana residents. In 2000 only 65.6 percent were high school graduates. Income
in Vermilion Parish is lower than in both Calcasieu and Cameron. Per capita income
in Vermilion Parish was only $14,201 in 1999 while median income stood at
$31,544. Like Cameron Parish, Vermilion Parish is dependent on the oil and gas
industry. It is also very agricultural. Rice, sugarcane and cattle dominate
agricultural production. Vermilion boasts a number of shrimpers and a smattering
of alligator farmers as well.
The southern portions of Cameron and Vermilion Parishes were decimated by
Hurricane Rita. Cameron Parish, which had suffered the wrath of Hurricane Audrey
in June of 1957, was hit with a massive tidal surge, drowning cattle and knocking
houses off foundations and washing them miles into the marshes. Memories of
Audrey, which killed close to 600 people (Gomez 1998), and the recent horrific
images of Katrina pushing flood waters into New Orleans at a rapid rate probably
saved the lives of Cameron residents. Practically everyone living in the southern

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jrss/vol22/iss2/2

6

Tootle: Disaster Recovery in Rural Communities: A Case Study of Southwest

12

SOUTHERN RURAL SOCIOLOGY

part of the parish evacuated before the storm hit; no deaths were attributed to the
storm.
The property damage, however, was almost inconceivable. Some houses were
completely splintered such that none of the pieces were recognizable. Most of the
few buildings left standing in the small coastal communities in Cameron were
gutted, their contents spilling out behind them in the marsh. Marsh grass and foulsmelling mud piled two and three feet high in the gutted houses. Those few
buildings remaining upright had mud all over first floor ceilings and sometimes on
the walls of the second floors. By the time first responders could get in, dead
alligators floated through the water or lay rotting on the side of the roads. Massive
balls of intertwined snakes floated among the debris. The shrimping and oil boats
that didn’t sink were shoved onto the roads and into marshes by the tidal surge. Oil,
gas and chemical tanks were scattered along the roads and the marshes. More than
a year later, the Parish had not yet finished removing the debris.
Conditions in lower Vermilion Parish were not much better. Homes flooded and
many rural residents were stranded as Rita pushed northward. Unlike the residents
of Cameron and Calcasieu, a significant number of the people living in lower
Vermilion Parish did not evacuate. Deputies from the Vermilion Parish Sheriff’s
Department and agents from the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries
set out in boats to rescue those who were stranded.
One young man videoed the water rushing through the window in his house.
Within minutes enough water poured into the house to float the refrigerator. He
and his father fled into the attic where they blasted a hole in the roof with a
shotgun. The man swam through the floodwaters to get a boat and came back to
rescue his father and other people stranded on their roofs.
When the waters stopped rising, cattlemen, many of whom lost their homes,
rode horses through chest high water to rescue cattle standing in and stranded by
the rapidly rising salt water. When the waters finally subsided, barges lay across
roads and salt encrusted pastures where cattle once grazed. Concrete burial vaults
had popped up out of the ground in cemeteries and floated away. Up until shortly
after Christmas 2005, residents in Vermilion Parish were finding deep sea fish,
small sharks and rays in their inundated rice and sugar cane fields.
According to Saenz and Peacock (2006) rural areas like Cameron and Vermilion
Parishes struggle to recover from disasters.
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(R)ural areas, because of their unique characteristics, are often more at risk
in disasters, and socially vulnerable populations all too often lose out in the
long-term recovery process (2006:1).
Given the rurality and depressed socioeconomic conditions in Cameron and
Vermilion Parishes, community recovery has been slower in these parishes than in
neighboring and urban Calcasieu Parish. With Lake Charles as the core city,
Calcasieu Parish had the ability to mobilize resources unavailable to Cameron and
Vermilion. Indeed, almost immediately after Rita hit, the mayor of Lake Charles
began to organize resources to address both the immediate relief and medium term
recovery issues. Hampered by extensive, catastrophic damages, and lack of
resources, these processes took far longer to organize in Cameron and Vermilion.
Traumatic Responses
Many, if not most, of the victims in coastal Cameron and lower Vermilion
Parishes appear to have experienced both of what Erikson (1976) refers to as
individual and collective trauma. Both are consistent with the descriptions of post
traumatic stress disorder described in the psychological literature on disaster
recovery (see Evans and Wiens 2004). Erikson’s descriptions of the sense of loss
and hopelessness experienced by the survivors of the Buffalo Creek Flood are
consistent with what I saw among the Rita survivors in the flooded coastal
communities. Erikson could have easily described Rita victims when he stated:
Most of the survivors responded to the disaster with a deep sense of loss, a
nameless feeling that something had gone awry in the order of things, that
their minds had been bruised beyond repair, that they would never again be
able to find coherence, that the world as they knew it had come to an end.
These feelings, of course, were experienced as a generalized, pervading
sense of gloom…(Erikson 1976:159).
Many of the people with whom I interacted tried very hard to transcend the
expression of these feelings but could not do so consistently. Outbreaks of tears and
flashes of anger were common. At an early community meeting, one Cameron
resident, who was not allowed to go back to his property, threatened to shoot the
National Guardsmen who were denying him access. It was not unusual for victims,
both women and men, to cry, yell and scream during community meetings.
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Emotions remained volatile and close to the surface during the entire time I was
working in Southwest Louisiana.
Rita victims also appeared to experience collective trauma. However, what
Erikson calls “loss of communality” I will refer to as loss of community, a much
broader term than Erikson uses. Erikson describes collective trauma as the loss of
social networks. In the Buffalo Creek flood, the loss of community was not tied to
place as much as it was to the people with whom the victims interacted.
In Cameron and Vermilion Parishes, the loss refers to both the material and
social resources attached to place. These losses are profound and affect the extent
to which communities can rebuild after disaster. Wilkinson (1991) tells us how
important these resources and the mobilization of resources are to community
action. Proposing a phase model of community action, Wilkinson outlines a fivestep process by which community actions take place: (1) awareness, (2)
organization, (3) decision-making, (4) recruitment and resource mobilization, and
(5) implementation and resource application. Because community resources are
necessary for communities to address local issues and problems (Luloff and Bridger
2003), the loss of material and social resources attached to the hurricane-stricken
communities can critically affect their ability for long-term community
redevelopment. Furthermore, community interaction, which has been severely
disrupted with the high levels of spatial dislocation in the coastal parishes, plays a
major role in whether or not resources can be effectively mobilized (Luloff and
Swanson 1995; Nigg and Tierney 1993).
The material and social resources attached to communities can be
conceptualized as what many refer to as “community capitals.” Flora (1998) argues
that when resources are used to create other resources, they become new forms of
capital. These place based resources are often referred to as the community capitals
and operationalized as financial and built capital, natural (environmental) capital,
political capital, human capital, and social capital (see Flora, Flora, and Fey 2004.)
The collective trauma and loss of community in Southwest Louisiana involved all
six of the community capitals, albeit to varying degrees in different areas.
Loss of Community Capital
The coastal communities in Cameron and Vermilion Parishes are ecologically
distinctive. The people living there are intimately attached to the landscape and
social relationships are frequently governed by the landscape. The communities are
built along Louisiana’s Chenier Plain (Gomez 1998). The cheniers are the sand and
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shell ridges that are mingled in but rise above the coastal marsh. Groves of oaks
grow in profusion on the cheniers.
Gomez’s description of this landscape highlights its uniqueness:
…the ridges that cross Louisiana’s Chenier Plain rise to maximum
elevations of 10 feet above sea level and occupy a mere 3 percent of the
region’s total area. The remainder is marshland: a vast, wet grassland
interspersed with bayous, canals, ponds and large lakes. These wetlands
compose nearly one-third of Louisiana’s coastal marsh, which in turn
accounts for 40 percent of the marshland in the contiguous United States
(Gomez 1998:15).
These wetlands, described by the people who lived there as “paradise” (Gomez
1998: x) supported a wide array of livelihoods. Much of the coastal marshland
described by Gomez was destroyed by Rita. Historically, the people who settled
these regions made their livings off the land and were dependent on the generosity
of the landscape.
Before Rita, residents combined modern occupations, such as working in the oil
and gas fields or service industries, with the more traditional wetland activities
based on raising cattle, fishing, trapping, and the harvest of alligators and
waterfowl. Most of the families living in these coastal communities have lived there
for generations and are embedded within extensive social networks. They possess
a rich cultural legacy defined as much by the natural environment as history.
Because of this historical attachment to the landscape, the loss of place and the
physical community caused by the flooding appears to be as profound in Southwest
Louisiana as the loss of the social networks in which the victims were embedded.
The attachment to the land is particularly evident in Cameron Parish, where 70
percent of the participants at a state and federally sponsored recovery meeting
(Louisiana Speaks) in January 2006 stated they were ready to move back to their
communities immediately; only 21 percent wanted to wait until it was a safer place
to live. In Vermilion Parish, 60 percent reported they wanted to wait until their
communities were safer places to live. None of the participants from Vermilion were
willing to move back at that time. In general, most of the locals believed that the
longer residents stayed away, the less likely they were to return. In rural Cameron
and Vermilion Parishes, this represents one more loss of human capital.
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It was obvious from the storm damages that the communities of Southwest
Louisiana lost valuable resources. Much of the coastal marshland and other systems
of the natural environment were either seriously damaged or destroyed. Most of the
physical infrastructure and built capital in lower Vermilion and Cameron Parishes
was destroyed. As residents relocated, human and social capital, and some political
capital, were also lost. Inevitably, some of the cultural capital, which was
documented in great detail in the Bates et al., (1963) study of Hurricane Audrey and
Gomez’s (1998) study of the Chenier Plain, was also depleted as the population
(especially the elderly) dispersed. This appears to be particularly true for Cameron
Parish, where even today, only about one third of the residents appear to have
returned (Kurth and Burckel 2006).
Recovery and Rebuilding: Outside Expertise
Rolfe and Britton (1995) point out that political conditions after a disaster also
affect community recovery. All levels of government desire to be perceived as
proactive and tend to favor highly visible relief and recovery activities. Short-term
needs of the population generally take precedence because the affected public exerts
significant pressure to address immediate needs. However, the resolution of
immediate needs is frequently inconsistent with a well-planned, long-term and
sustainable recovery processes. These highly visible recovery policies tend to have
short-term impacts and eventually short-circuit sustainability. Emphasis on the
short term contributes to chaotic, as opposed to well-planned, recovery.
Hundreds of organizations assisted in the immediate relief stage of recovery.
Far fewer have been involved in the long-term redevelopment process. Although
the recovery and redevelopment processes have involved many players, at the local,
state and federal levels, the most visible efforts have been orchestrated at the state
and federal levels through the Louisiana Recovery Authority (LRA) and the Federal
Emergency Management Authority (FEMA) and their federal agency partners. The
most prominent of the Federal agencies were the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(Rural Development) and the U.S. Department of and Housing and Urban
Development. Local governments were obviously involved but were frequently
overwhelmed by the catastrophic events. They generally deferred to state and
federal governments.
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The Louisiana universities were also engaged in the redevelopment process
within those areas in which we had expertise.1 In general, we worked with local
governments. For the most part, we were not engaged by either the LRA or FEMA
until later on in the recovery process when the FEMA personnel in the field offices
requested the assistance of the Louisiana Cooperative Extension Service in the
recovery and rebuilding planning process.
The process was consistent with the observations made by Rolf and Britton
(1995). It was chaotic at best. The confrontational relationships between the state
and federal governments that began in the immediate aftermath of Katrina colored
efforts in the hurricane recovery and rebuilding processes throughout the state. In
the nine months in which I was in the field, the process was characterized by
conflict, uncertainty and inconsistency. Both the state and federal government
struggled to be perceived as more proactive than the other (see Dynes and Aguirre,
1978 for a discussion on control in disaster recovery). Many of us in the field
(including some of the veteran FEMA professionals) felt that much of the chaos in
organizing for the recovery planning process was the result of Federal and state
governments competing with each other, rather than working together toward a
shared vision. In the following, I briefly describe the roles that the LRA and FEMA
played in the planning process and the various efforts that took place in Southwest
Louisiana during this time.
Louisiana Recovery Authority
On October 17, 2005, roughly a month and a half post-Katrina and almost a
month post-Rita, Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco organized the Louisiana
Recovery Authority to “lead the state’s recovery and rebuilding efforts.” (LRA
2006). The manifest purpose of the LRA was to work:

1

The LSU AgCenter’s Hurricane Rita Recovery Task Force was formed in early October

2005. The Task Force organized, developed, and began implementing a plan for short, medium and
long-term activities that fell within our range of expertise. These areas included crops and livestock,
housing, community and rural development, fisheries and aquaculture, forest-based resources,
housing, and youth and family development. W e worked directly with the parish governments of the
affected parishes and with the City of Lake Charles. W e also worked with other partners within the
LSU system. Faculty in the LSU College of Art and Design were active in providing the Southwestern
coastal communities assistance in architectural design. Other universities, such as the University of
Louisiana in Lafayette, also provided assistance with architectural design.
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with Governor Blanco to plan for Louisiana's future, coordinate across
jurisdictions, support community recovery and resurgence, and ensure
integrity and effectiveness. Working in collaboration with local, state and
federal agencies, the authority is also addressing short-term recovery needs
while simultaneously guiding the long-term planning process (LRA 2006).

The Board, designed to perform as an advisory group for the Governor, is
composed of 33 directors, all appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the
Senate. An examination of the biographies of these political appointees suggests
that none have any experience in disaster recovery management. However, most
have some history of working with civic organizations and community
improvement projects and were generally perceived as people who could mobilize
critical resources for recovery. In November 2005, the LRA contracted with two
nationally recognized architectural and urban design firms to help in the rebuilding
process.
Federal Emergency Management Association
In contrast, FEMA mobilized personnel from all over the country to work in
hurricane recovery in Louisiana. They organized the Emergency Support Function
14 (ESF-14) Long Term Community Recovery Teams for Southwest Louisiana in
October. Some of the FEMA personnel had been working in the Katrina area and
in October were detailed to work in the Southwestern parishes. Some were full-time
employees and others were hired as consultants specifically to work on the
Louisiana hurricane recovery. A few had worked in hurricane recovery; others had
worked through disasters in other states. FEMA personnel working in the parishes
worked out of FEMA “Storefronts.” Because FEMA was not well regarded in
coastal parishes, Storefronts were policed by the National Guard. Other FEMA
personnel worked directly out of FEMA Headquarters in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
Eventually, FEMA brought in subject area specialists from other Federal agencies
and hired a number of local workers to aid in the long term recovery process.
However, the ESF-14 teams struggled to provide the needed assistance in long
term recovery. A long-term FEMA veteran related:
ESF-14 ha(s) constant changes in leadership in Louisiana…. Each time a
new Leader entered, they brought their “team”…. Boom, everything
changes, both internally as to staff's policy formulation and external
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relationships such as with the Governor's office…and the LRA.… It was
naturally volatile, in flux. There as no “even keel” of dogma or theory to
stabilize the situation when the leadership switches occurred…. None of the
leadership teams had an educational or work background in planning. I can't
begin to tell you how many times we heard the phrase, “I’m not a planner,
but...” Can you imagine the calamity if we built suspension bridges that way,
where the chief designer would say, "I'm not an engineer, but...?”
The saga of ESF-14 transformation continues. FEMA leaders tend to come
from military or engineering backgrounds: precise and decisive. Those are two
words that don't describe intergovernmental relations. Fuzzy and incremental are
words better suited to this realm. Against that background, it's easy to see why
ESF-14 was so conflicted. The wrong people following the wrong methods to get
the wrong outcomes (Confidential personal communication 2006).
Recovery Planning Processes
Parish Recovery Efforts. FEMA and the LRA, working in tandem out of the
hurricane recovery headquarters in Baton Rouge, shouldered most of the
responsibility for community recovery in the aftermath of the two hurricanes that
devastated the south Louisiana coastline. However, remnants of the tensions
between the Louisiana state government and the Federal government that
developed post Katrina seemed to interfere with the development of a good working
relationship between the two organizations.
Sources from inside the hurricane recovery headquarters reported that
considerable struggles over ownership of the process pervaded all of their activities.
The process became chaotic and plans were ever changing. Those of us in the field
worked with FEMA personnel heading up the long term community recovery
planning process (ESF-14). FEMA attempted to implement the same type of
bottom-up community planning processes they had used in other disasters to create
disaster recovery plans. The LRA approach, on the other hand, was to follow the
guidelines set by their architectural firm consultants and was much more of a top
down process.
In March 2006, the FEMA ESF-14 long term community recovery efforts
ceased to exist as such. The “new” and highly publicized process became known as
Louisiana Speaks and Louisiana, via the LRA, took more ownership of the recovery
process. Many communities had already begun to work with their local
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governments, FEMA ESF-14 teams, and the universities in the process of
gathering public input to develop recovery and rebuilding plans. However, FEMA,
working under the auspices of the LRA, organized a new series of meetings to
collect public input data. The meetings were controversial; many of the residents
in Cameron and Vermilion Parishes felt the meetings were redundant and that they
were being penalized for taking initiative and organizing their own meetings. They
resented starting the process over again.
Nonetheless, the LRA meetings were relatively well attended. The data
generated from these meetings were used to put together a lengthy parish by parish
recovery plan which was made public on March 20, 2006. The web site
http://www.louisianaspeaks-parishplans.org was developed and paid for by ESF-14
and subsequently turned over to the LRA in April (Reid 2007). The parish recovery
planning process appeared to be taking on some shape.
Neighborhood and Regional Planning Efforts. As the parish recovery processes
were underway, the LRA was organizing another type of meeting. One of the urban
design firms hired by the LRA initiated a set of charrettes (intense, week-long town
planning events that are designed to solicit community input) in the City of Lake
Charles (in Calcasieu Parish) and in the small towns of Delcambre and Erath in
Vermilion Parish. The charrettes were received more favorably in urban than rural
areas. In Lake Charles, the results of the charrette, which focused on downtown
redevelopment, were greeted with a standing ovation.
The small shrimping communities of Erath and Delcambre (Vermilion Parish)
were another story. Residents were violently opposed to the plan as it was unveiled.
The urban design firm proposed demolishing the houses in the flooded sections and
building a planned community on higher ground. The community would be
surrounded by a manmade canal that would provide shrimpers access to the
Vermilion Bay and the inlets where they fished. However, the homes the design
firm proposed demolishing were built on property that had been in families for
generations. The design team proposed a modern subdivision complete with
covenants, retention ponds that could be used for recreational fishing, and plans for
waterfront shops that would draw tourists and recreational fishermen into a
struggling, limited resource fishing community. Residents were highly offended and
very angry.
In July 2006, the consultants from the architectural firm began holding still
more planning meetings in several locations throughout southern Louisiana.
According to the LRA (2006), the goal of these meetings was to build a network of
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stakeholders who would “begin creating the rebuilding scenarios that will guide the
development of South Louisiana’s 25-year plan” (LRA 2006: Executive Summary).
Once more, the Southwest Louisiana residents with whom we worked did not
understand the need or the reason for these meetings and for the most part,
resented “jumping through hoops.”
CONCLUSION
I began this study in an effort to develop a better understanding of the social
forces affecting community recovery and rebuilding after natural disasters.
Hurricane Rita left residents in Southwestern Louisiana living in disorder and
disarray. The destruction was catastrophic. The landscape after the storm had
passed was surreal; it resembled a disaster movie set. With few exceptions, the
recovery and rebuilding process has been chaotic, rather than orderly and
progressive.2 This has been a defining moment in the lives of the people living along
the northern Gulf of Mexico. As I began this study, I realized we do not know that
much about how communities recover from disasters. Because we don’t understand
the dynamics of disaster recovery and rebuilding, we are probably not doing as
much as we can to help these communities and the people living in them.
What I found after nine months in the field was that we have a fairly good
understanding of how to rebuild physical infrastructure. Indeed, FEMA’s expertise
derives primarily from the military and engineering ranks. They brought in their
technical expertise from other government agencies to provide advice on rebuilding
roads, bridges and housing. The stumbling blocks in rebuilding infrastructure were
not so much the “how,” but rather the “should we?” and “where do we find the
resources?” The answers to these questions are more social than technical.
Rolfe and Britton (1995) and others (see Petterson 1999) have pointed out that
the recovery process is largely dependent upon social forces. Pre-existing
2

It has been mentioned previously that the City of Lake Charles and Calcasieu Parish appear

to be on their way to full recovery. One reason for their ability to recover is that they did not receive
the full brunt of the hurricane’s devastating tidal forces. I repeatedly heard people in Calcasieu
Parish say that they were spared because Cameron Parish, just south of Calcasieu buffeted the storms
forces. The natural and physical infrastructure in Lake Charles, although heavily damaged, was left
more intact that that in neighboring parishes and communities. The other reason that the City of
Lake Charles and Calcasieu Parish were able to move forward has to do with the exemplary
leadership within the City and Parish. Both of these areas survived Hurricane Rita with a significant
amount of their social and political capital intact.
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socioeconomic conditions and pre and post disaster political environment are the
most frequently cited factors affecting disaster recovery. After nine months in the
field, I agree with these positions but feel that we need to dig much, much deeper
and get below the surface of these arguments. We need to (1) develop a better
understanding of community resources and how community action takes place after
a disaster, and (2) educate policy makers on the social dynamics underlying
community action and community redevelopment.
Community Resources and Action
Socioeconomic conditions matter. It was easier to pull together the necessary
resources in urban and relatively affluent Lake Charles than it was in struggling
Cameron and Vermilion Parishes. Lake Charles recovered and is rebuilding faster
than the communities in the rural Cameron and Vermilion Parishes. Those
residents in Southwest Louisiana who want to rebuild and have the resources with
which to rebuild, are rebuilding.
However, I also observed some other socioeconomic factors that affect the
process of community recovery and rebuilding. We typically focus most of our
community efforts on rebuilding the physical and financial infrastructure. We have
paid less attention to the natural, human and social infrastructures. Yet, it is social
interaction and social infrastructure that provide for community action and the
social organization that allows for community development (Flora et al. 1997;
Swanson 1992; Wilkinson 1991).
The importance of voice and power became obvious in my nine months in the
field. Both became serious and contentious issues in the planning process. This was
particularly the case in the City of Lake Charles; residents in African-American
neighborhoods believed their voices were not being heard by the city and regional
planners involved in the process. In other areas, such as the previously described
small shrimping communities in Vermilion Parish, local residents did not feel that
the outside experts (the planners and designer teams) listened or responded to their
needs. Basically, in both cases, the technical experts failed to sufficiently engage
community members in the planning processes and the “importance of local
knowledge, action, participation and control in determining the nature of
community response and recovery” (Flint and Luloff 2005:402) was not
acknowledged.
However, despite the abysmally slow nature of recovery, there are some
community redevelopment projects are underway. They speak to the importance
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of community action. Most of these recovery projects are relatively small and
pertain to specifically targeted, community defined issues.3 They are for the most
part, initiated and acted upon at the local level by local champions.
Educating Policy Makers
The political environment and the ongoing conflicts between the local, state and
Federal levels of government have confounded the recovery process. It is highly
likely that the process of devolution, which left local governments with more
responsibility and fewer resources (Garkovich and Irby 1998) also impeded the
ability of state and local government to address critical recovery and rebuilding
issues. The local governments in Southwest Louisiana have to be commended for
emergency preparedness and quick response to rising waters; no lives were lost in
these areas. However, neither they nor state government had any plans or resources
in place for rebuilding. The Federal government, on the other hand, could mobilize
the disaster experience and expertise to manage the recovery and rebuilding,
through FEMA,4 but therein lies a problem.
The Federal and state approaches for long term recovery are embedded within
a hazards paradigm of disaster response and recovery. This paradigm relies on
technical solutions to community recovery and bypasses the role of social
interaction and capacity for action at the community level. The organizations with
the most responsibility for disaster recovery are working under the assumption that
communities and the people within those communities are incapable of addressing
issues related to community redevelopment. They are, in essence, ignoring the
complexities of the community development process.
3

For example, a Sea Grant agent in Cameron Parish is working with local shrimpers and

one of the local oil companies housed in Cameron Parish to get an ice plant started. Shrimpers and
other fishermen lost the seafood industry infrastructure during Rita. Despite an abundance of shrimp
in the Gulf of Mexico (the “Bubba Gump” phenomenon), work opportunities for fishermen were
almost non-existent without ice. Bringing in an ice plant, although far less ambitious than the
visionary projects identified in the many planning processes, is the result of locally based decisionmaking, mobilization of local talent, and leveraging of local resources and networks to find local
solutions. However, it is an example of a project that will put a large number of residents to work
and bring needed income into the community.
4

A long-time FEMA contractor (who wishes to remain anonymous) reported to me that

because of significant administrative and organizational changes, as well as large turnovers in
employees, FEMA was not as effective and efficient as it had been in previous years.
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So, as social scientists, what do we do to help policy makers develop an
understanding of the process? First, we need to conduct more research on longterm community redevelopment so that we develop a better understanding of the
dynamics of the community development process under conditions created by and
associated with catastrophic events. The study of the impacts of Hurricane Audrey
on Cameron Parish, Louisiana, that Fred Bates and his colleagues (1963) is a rare
example of this type of comprehensive and in-depth work. Hewitt suggested this
strategy in 1995. For the most part (and for many reasons, including funding), we
have not been successful in implementing this type of research activity. Second, we
need to make sure that we improve the policy relevance of our discipline and
interact with the policy community to better inform public policy (Beaulieu 2005)
on the social processes associated with disaster response and recovery. As Beaulieu
(2005:25) told us in his 2004 Rural Sociological Society presidential address “The
time is right for rural sociology … to serve as valuable sources of information on
policies that have, or might have, on rural people and places.”
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